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Left-Behind Children and Return Decisions of Rural Migrants in China 
 
Sylvie Démurgera & Hui Xua, b* 
 
This version - July 2011 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines how left-behind children influence return migration in China. We first 
present a simple model that incorporates economic and non-economic motives for migration duration 
(or intentions to return). Based on Dustmann (2003b), the parent is assumed to be altruistic and to care 
about the prospects of her left-behind children. We then propose two complementary empirical tests 
based on an original dataset from a rural household survey carried out in Wuwei County (Anhui 
province, China) in fall 2008. We first use a discrete-time proportional hazard model to estimate the 
determinants of migration duration for both on-going migrants with incomplete length of duration and 
return migrants with complete length of duration. Second, we apply a binary Probit model to study the 
return intentions of on-going migrants. Both models find consistent results regarding the role of 
left-behind children as a significant motive for return. First, left-behind children are found to pull their 
parents back to the village, the effect being stronger for pre-school children. Second, sons are found to 
play a more important role than daughters in reducing migration duration. 
 
Keywords: return migration, migration duration, left-behind children, discrete-time duration analysis, 
China. 
JEL classification: J61, J13, C41, C25, O53. 
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Left-Behind Children and Return Decisions of Rural Migrants in China 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Economic development is often combined with the transfer of a large proportion of workers from 
the rural-based traditional agricultural sector to the urban industrial sector. China has been witnessing 
such a massive internal transfer since the mid-80s (Li, 2010). The latest official figures from the Sixth 
National Population Census released in April 2011 estimate the total number of rural migrant workers 
at 261.4 million in 20101. Such large-scale internal migration results from a series of institutional and 
structural changes along with rapid industrialization. Before the reforms started in 1978, labor 
mobility was strictly controlled. Since then, the government policy has been loosened up, moving 
from permitting rural labor mobility, to guiding rural labor mobility and then to encouraging rural 
labor mobility (Wang and Cai, 2009). Thanks to the relaxation of various regulations, people are now 
free to move to places they want (Zhang, 2010), and to decide on the length of their stay.  
Yet, while labor mobility in China has dramatically increased over time, temporary migration 
dominates population movements that are shaped by the strong institutional constraint imposed by the 
household registration system (Hukou). Formally established in 1958, this system requires every 
Chinese citizen to be registered according to her place of permanent residence and occupation 
(agricultural versus non-agricultural)2. As argued by Knight and Song (2005, p. 17), it functions as a 
“de facto internal passport system” that confers different legal rights to residents. In villages, residents 
are given rights to land for farming and housing while in cities, residents are given access to urban 
jobs and rights to a package of welfare and social benefits. Though the system has been reformed in 
terms of labor mobility, access to public services remains deeply tied to the household registration 
place, to the disadvantage of migrants. This is notably the case for children education. As the 
                                                        
1 In Chinese statistics, rural migrants are persons working and living outside the town of their household 
registration for a period over six months. Out of the total figure, 40 million were working within their 
municipality or prefecture-level city and 221.4 million further away from home. Compared to the 2000 Fifth 
National Population Census, the population in the second category rose by 81 percent over the 10-year period. 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomingevents/t20110428_402722244.htm.  
2 See Chan and Buckingham (2008) for a detailed description of the household registration system, both 
historically and in light of the recent waves of reform. 
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education budget for the nine-year compulsory education in China is allocated through local 
governments and is not transferable, urban schools with a limited education budget are reluctant to 
accept rural migrant children, unless their parents compensate for the additional cost. Hence, though 
rural migrant children are not officially denied access to the urban public school system, parents are 
requested to pay “education endorsement fees” (jiaoyu zanzhu fei) for children attending school in 
places other than their place of household registration, and the amount of such fees can be prohibitive 
for poor migrant families (Lai and Chen, 2010). At the non-compulsory senior high school level, 
additional registration place-based constraints also apply since the education policy requires students 
to take the university/college entrance examination in their hukou registration area3 . A direct 
consequence of such administrative and financial barriers is that migrant children are often left behind 
in rural home regions as long as they are enrolled in the education system, and looked after either by 
one parent or by their grandparents or relatives (including family, neighbors or friends). 
As more and more people are involved in internal migration, the number of “left-behind” children 
(liushou ertong) is also increasing dramatically. According to the All China Women’s Federation, there 
were a total of 58 million left-behind children in rural China in 2009, of which more than 40 million 
were below the age of 144. Together with another 19 million living with their migrant parents in cities, 
the two groups account for about one quarter of all children in China (Chan, 2009). As compared to 
2006, the number of left-behind children in 2009 is almost triple5. Data gathered as part of the 
Rural–Urban Migration in China and Indonesia (RUMiCI) project confirm that many migrant children 
grow up apart from their parents: in 2007, about 60% of the migrant children aged 16 and below were 
left behind in the rural hometown (Gong et al., 2008). 
As pointed out by Rossi (2008), leaving children behind is a source of potentially high “social 
cost of migration” although migration may also bring benefits to the left-behind family through 
remittance transfers that relax budget constraint and thereby increase health and education 
opportunities (Cox Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Rapoport and Docquier, 2006). Migration can affect 
children in various dimensions. Children who grow up either with a single parent or with 
                                                        
3 The examination system is not uniform across China, and its implementation varies greatly at a provincial 
level. In 1987, Shanghai municipality pioneered in designing its own university entrance examination. Since 
then, more and more provinces have participated into this independent decision system. Up to 2005, 14 
provinces and municipalities had independently decided the content of their university entrance examination. 
(http://www.china.com.cn/education/zhuanti/hfgk30/2007-05/29/content_8316780.htm) (in Chinese). 
4 http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-05/27/content_1325494.htm. (in Chinese). 
5 http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90782/6818318.html. 
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grand-parents or other relatives may suffer from a lack of parental care that adversely affects their 
educational outcomes (Frisancho Robles and Oropesa, 2011; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010). 
Moreover, the break-up of the family unit can create material and psychological insecurity that affects 
the well-being of children left behind. As for China, there is small body of literature that examines 
left-behind children well-being by focusing on different facets of living arrangements’ outcomes such 
as school performance and health condition6. Mixed results have been found regarding the effect of 
migration on children school performance. Using data from the 2006 China Health and Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS), Lee (2011) shows that migrant children are worse off in terms of school enrollment 
and years of schooling as compared to children whose parents do not migrate. Using the 2007 
RUMiCI data, Gong et al. (2008) compare school performance of migrant children who live in cities 
with those left-behind and find that the latter perform better. On the other hand, using survey data from 
36 primary schools in Shaanxi province in 2006, Chen et al. (2009) do not find any significant 
negative effect of migration on school performance. With respect to health outcomes, Gao et al. (2010) 
find that parental migration is a risk factor for unhealthy behaviors amongst adolescent school children 
in rural China. Gong et al. (2008) report better conditions for migrant children living with their parents 
in cities as compared to children left behind. Finally, Kong and Meng (2010) find that children of 
migrants (either left-behind or in cities) are less likely to have good education and health outcomes as 
compared to rural non-migrant children and urban children. 
As family ties in the Chinese society remain very strong, there are good reasons to expect that 
concerns about the welfare of the left-behind family may affect migration (and return) decisions. 
Accounting for the social cost motive of leaving behind children in the determination of the length of 
rural-urban migration in China is of importance, not only from an academic point of view but also in 
terms of policy implication. As an example, the recent growing tension about “migrant labor shortage” 
in China’s coastal cities, where booming small and private enterprises have absorbed a large quantity 
of migrants from western China has put forward the importance of family factors in explaining the 
labor shortage. Hence, anecdotal evidence from interviews conducted by the Guangzhou Daily in 
February 20117 indicates that left-behind children are a major reason for migrants not to go back to 
cities after the Lunar New Year holiday. Moreover, as mentioned above, the hukou system is 
                                                        
6 The Chinese-language literature is more voluminous on these issues than the English-language literature. For 
additional references in Chinese, see Chen et al. (2009) and Gao et al. (2010). 
7 http://media.workercn.cn/c/2011/04/06/110406103941721910878.html (in Chinese). 
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considered as an important reason for the transient nature of migration. Evaluating the role of children 
on individual’s decision on migration duration can thus help bringing up a better understanding of the 
multidimensional impact of the hukou system on migration.  
The overall goal of this paper is to explore the role of children as a motive for return migration in 
China. To meet this goal, we first present a simple illustrative model of migration duration (or 
intentions to return) based on Dustmann (2003b), which accounts for left-behind children through 
parents’ altruistic behavior. The discussion also points to the potential differentiated impact of children 
on return decisions depending on their age and their gender. Then, using a unique data set collected in 
2008, we provide an empirical test based on two complementary approaches. We first use a duration 
model to estimate the determinants of the length of migration for both on-going migrants with 
incomplete migration spells and return migrants with complete migration spells. Second, we apply a 
binary Probit model to study the return intentions of on-going migrants. Both models find consistent 
results regarding the role of left-behind children as a significant motive for return. 
Our paper contributes to the existing literature at least in two ways. First, although children may 
be important stakeholders in the migration phenomenon, little attention has been given to children in 
the analysis of migration decisions. A few exceptions are Djajic (2008) and Dustmann (2003b). To our 
knowledge, this paper is the first to explore the process that links the decision on migration duration 
and return intentions to concerns about left-behind children in China. By examining the determinants 
of the length of migration, this paper also contributes to fulfilling the lack of research on migration 
duration in China. Although the length of migration is an important indicator of the flow and the scale 
of migration as well as of the economic effects on both receiving and sending regions, it has received 
limited attention in the migration literature8. As pointed out by Dustmann (2003a), “we know little 
about the determinants of migrant’s duration abroad”. As far as China is concerned, the issue has a 
strong political importance because there is a fear that, if cities cannot adequately absorb those 
migrants, it may eventually lead to social unrest. Yet, up to now, no research has specifically addressed 
this question for China.  
Second, the dearth of data is an important limit to the study of the interaction between left-behind 
children and migration duration. The dataset used in this paper offers recent and rich information 
                                                        
8 One may yet refer to Carrión-Flores (2006), Djajic (2008), Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002), Dustmann 
(2003a; 2003b), Kirdar (2010), Lindstrom (1996), Schroll (2009) and Stark et al. (1997). 
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including complete and incomplete length of migration duration, return intentions of on-going 
migrants as well as detailed individual and household characteristics. This enables us to offer a richer 
analysis on how left-behind children influence return migration in China.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the study area and provides descriptive 
statistics on migration duration and intentions to return. Section 3 presents a simple illustrative model. 
Section 4 examines the determinants of migration duration with a duration model. Section 5 
investigates the determinants of return intentions with a Probit model. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Study area 
 
2.1 Migration in Wuwei County 
 
The data used in this paper come from a series of rural households’ interviews conducted in 
Wuwei County, Anhui province, from September to November 2008. Wuwei County was selected 
because of its relatively long labor force export history, the county being famous for sending out 
domestic service female workers since the beginning of the 1980s. According to local official statistics, 
at the end of 2006, individuals working outside the county accounted for 43 percent of the entire rural 
labor force in Wuwei County (Wuwei County Government, 2007). Together with a large-scale 
migration, Wuwei County is also characterized by a sizable number of left-behind children. A recent 
survey indicates a total number of about 120,000 left-behind children for a total of 400,000 migrants in 
the county (Mei, 2009). A detailed investigation conducted by the County Women’s Federation in 
Hedian town (one of the 23 towns of the county) shows that 64.7% of the students at school in the 
town are left-behind children. Among them, 76.7% have both parents away. In 42.8% of the cases, 
grand-parents are taking care of the left-behind child, and in the other 56.6%, relatives or friends are 
taking care of the left-behind child (with 0.6% reported to be left alone with no guardian). The 
frequency of the parents’ visits are once a year for 58.2% of the cases, once every two years for 27.1% 
and less than once every two years for 14.7% (Mei, 2009). 
Four towns were chosen for the survey: Gaogou, Liudu, Dougou and Tanggou. Three 
administrative villages in each town and twenty households on average in each village were randomly 
selected. A total of 239 households were interviewed, providing information on 969 individuals. The 
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data were collected in a form of a questionnaire, consisting of a series of questions about both family 
and individual members. Individual information includes personal characteristics (e.g., age, sex, 
education, etc.), actual working position and incomes. For those having a migration and/or return 
migration history, their working experience during and after migration was also recorded. A separate 
administrative village survey was also conducted in each village to collect information about the 
general economic, geographic as well as demographic conditions in the locality. 
The sample used in this paper is composed of 284 individuals having a migration and/or return 
migration history, with 124 return migrants9 and 160 on-going migrants. This primary data set is 
unique in the sense that it contains detailed information both on the complete length of migration for 
each return migrant and the incomplete length of migration for on-going migrants. For return migrants, 
the length of migration duration is defined from the year of an individual’s first time migration up to 
the year of her last return. For on-going migrants, the length of migration duration is calculated from 
the year of an individual’s first time migration until the year of the survey.  
Moreover, for on-going migrants, the survey provides information about return intentions. Indeed, 
households were asked whether on-going individual migrants wish to remain permanently in the 
destination area or whether they wish to return home at some point in the future. If on-going migrants 
were absent from home at the time of the survey, answers were given by family members (e.g. 
household head or spouse) who also answered other questions in the questionnaire. Out of the 160 
on-going migrants, we obtained clear information on their return intentions for 117 individuals and we 
construct a dummy variable that equals one for those who declared intending to return soon or in the 
future, and 0 for those declaring to have no intention to return10.  
Information gathered during the survey gives some hints on the importance of the left-behind 
children phenomenon in the area as well as on its possible relation with return decision. Most 
school-age children (76.4%) are found to be living in the local town or village, and only 2.5% are 
living with their migrant parents in cities. A small part of children (16%) are living alone in other 
places outside the county: this is mostly the case for students of above high school level who pursue 
studies in other regions. Though our data did not directly record the situation for pre-school children 
                                                        
9 Return migrants are individuals who are currently residing and working in the county, with at least 6 months 
migration working experience outside the county. 
10 The 43 out-migrants for whom we do not have clear intention to return or to settle in cities are kept in the 
sample used in the migration duration analysis, but excluded from the sample used in the return intention 
analysis. 
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(under the age of 6), pre-school children are facing a similar situation of separation from their parents. 
The survey also collected information on the reasons for return migration, with multiple answers 
allowed. Out of all the reasons provided, 25% were related to children, either to “look after children” 
or “for children’s education” 11.  
 
2.2 Data description 
 
As shown in Table 1, the mean length of migration for the overall sample is 6.81 years, and 32% 
of migrants have experienced more than 8 years of migration12. The mean lengths of stay for both 
on-going migrants and return migrants are fairly close, though a bit longer for the former (6.87 years 
vs. 6.74 years). The pairwise correlation of the length of migration with the year of migration is 
negative and significant for both return migrants and on-going migrants: earlier migrants are more 
likely to have longer migration duration than more recent migrants13.  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the overall sample as well as for return migrants and for 
out-migrants who intend to return. For the overall sample of migrants, the average age is 34 years, the 
average education level is 6.8 years, and 72% are married. In terms of household characteristics, the 
average size of the migrant household is 4.7; 53.9% of migrants have children under the age of 16, 
28.2% have children under the age of 6, 36.3% have sons (under the age of 16), and 29.2% have 
daughters (under the age of 16). The average number of children under the age of 16 per migrant is 
0.75, with 0.41 sons and 0.35 daughters. Interestingly, when it comes to children under the age of 6 
(0.32 per migrant), the gender composition is more equal, with 0.16 sons and 0.17 daughters. 
Regarding the sub-sample of return migrants, they are significantly much older and more likely to 
be married than the out-migrant population14. Family characteristics indicate that return migrants have 
a household size significantly smaller than out-migrants, with significantly fewer young children 
(under the age of 6). No significant difference is found for children under the age of 16, or for the 
                                                        
11 In some instances, parents even reported returning “for the sake of children’s education because of the 
hukou”. 
12 This average duration of migration is consistent with larger urban-based migrant surveys findings, including 
the 2007 RUMiCI survey, which reports an average duration of 7 to 8 years for on-going migrants. See Gong et 
al. (2008) for a comparison of all survey data available for China. 
13 The correlation coefficients are -0.65 for the whole population, -0.95 for out-migrants, and -0.52 for return 
migrants. All the correlations are statistically significant at 1 percent. 
14 The comparison between return migrants and out-migrants (whatever their intentions in terms of return) is 
based on mean tests not reported here. 
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gender composition of children, whatever their age. 
Regarding the sub-sample of out-migrants who intend to return, an interesting finding is that 
while their individual characteristics do not significantly differ from the sample population15, there are 
a number of significant differences on family composition. The household size is significantly higher. 
They have more children of both sex, more pre-school children (<6), and more daughters under the 
age of 6 than both the sample population and other out-migrants. Interestingly, 67.6% of out-migrants 
who intend to return have at least one child (as compared to the sample mean of 53.9%), and 52.9% 
have at least one son, against 36.3% for the whole sample. Differences are even more pronounced for 
pre-school children since 41.2% of out-migrants who intend to return have a pre-school child (against 
28.2% for the whole sample), but the gender difference now falls on girls (29.4% have a pre-school 
daughter against 15.1% for the whole sample). 
 
3. A simple model of return decision with left-behind children 
 
Return migration can be considered as part of a lifetime utility maximization plan with given 
budget (and liquidity) constraints (Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996). In the existing literature, the return 
motives notably include location preferences with a higher marginal utility of consumption in the area 
of origin (Djajic and Milbourne, 1988), a higher purchasing power of the destination area currency at 
home (Djajic, 1989; Stark et al., 1997) and higher returns to human capital accumulated in the 
destination area at home (Dustmann, 2001; Dustmann et al., 2011). However, as highlighted by 
Dustmann (2003b) and Djajic (2008), the decision to return and the optimal time of return can also be 
influenced by altruistic motives of parents towards their offspring in the household. Hence, the 
migration behavior, and the decision to return, may be driven not only by individual life-cycle 
consideration, but also by dynastic motives such as offspring’s welfare in the future16. Emphasizing the 
family unit rather than the individual migrant makes sense in rural China where family ties are strong 
and may be important components in explaining individual decisions. Moreover, with migration 
patterns shaped by the household registration system (hukou) that does not entitle rural migrants to 
                                                        
15 However, when only compared to other out-migrants, those who intend to return are older, more likely to be 
married and less educated. 
16 Considering the household, rather than the individual, as the most appropriate decision-making unit in return 
migration falls in the line of the “New Economics of Labor Migration” (NELM) literature that explicitly 
integrates migration decision into a household strategy (Taylor, 1999). 
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urban benefits and leaves most children behind, such approach seems the most relevant.  
The simple model presented below is meant to be illustrative of the conjectured influence of 
left-behind children on return migration. It builds on Dustmann (2003b) and includes a number of 
alterations to account for Chinese specific features. First, we assume that the parent migrates alone and 
leaves behind her child. Second, since we are interested in school-age or pre-school children in the 
home village, we also assume that the child does not work in the second period. Given these two 
assumptions, the proposed model captures the situation of a family unit composed of a worker 
engaged in migration (the parent migrant) and a left-behind child. 
We consider two periods. In period 1, the parent works and lives in a city, while her child lives in 
the countryside and is subsidized by the parent. In period 2, the parent may decide to return or stay in 
city. The parent decides about her own consumption in periods 1 and 2, as well as the child's 
consumption in periods 1 and 2. Since the child is not assumed to work in period 2, the altruism of the 
parent takes place through income transfer to the child in period 1, and through daily care (in case of 
return) or income transfer (in case of settlement in city) in period 2. As in Dustmann (2003b), the 
return decision is taken by simply comparing lifetime welfare in the two locations. 
The utility functions of the parent are supposed to take the usual logarithmic form. Period 1 utility 
function U1 is given by:  
),ln()ln(),( 11111 kckcU               (1) 
where c1 is the consumption of the migrant parent, k1 is the consumption of the left-behind child and 
the parameter γ (assumed positive) is the altruism weight.  
Period 2 utility function U2j depends on the location choice of the migrant: settled in city (j=M) or 
returned home (j=R), and is given by: 
),ln()ln(),( 22222 jjjjjjj bkackcU             (2) 
where aj and bj are preference parameters. In particular, aR > aM and bR > bM reflect a location 
preference of the migrant for her home village in terms of both her own consumption (a) and her 
offspring's consumption (b).  
Under the simplifying assumption of no discounting, the total utility function U of the parent can 
be simply expressed as follows:  
)],ln()[ln()]ln())[ln(1()ln()ln( 222211 RRRRMMMM bkachbkachkcU    (3) 
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where the parameter h stands for the return decision. At h=1, the migrant decides to return; at h=0, she 
settles in city. 
The budget constraint of the parent is supposed to be of the following form: 
,)1()1()1( 221221221 RMRMRM hyyhyhkkhkhcchc      (4) 
where y1, y2M and y2R are income of the parent in period 1, in period 2 in city and in period 2 at home, 
respectively.  
The return decision of the migrant rests on the maximization of her utility U with respect to her 
own consumption in periods 1 and 2, as well as to her left-behind child in periods 1 and 2, under the 
budget constraint expressed above for two scenarios: settling in city (h=0) or returning to the 
countryside (h=1). The intertemporal utility maximization leads to the following results. The migrant 
parent will choose to return if: 
.0lnlnln)1(2 21
21











 M
R
M
R
M
R
b
b
a
a
yy
yy           (5) 
As in Dustmann (2003b), the first term illustrates the income impact of return on total utility: as 
earnings can be assumed to be lower at home (y2R < y2M), the decision to return will entail a loss in 
utility. The loss in utility is higher for altruistic parents (γ>0) because their reduced earnings also affect 
the child outcomes. This may be the case for instance if the reduced earnings contribute to reduce 
opportunities for education or health care. This first term captures the “educational prospect” 
dimension as described below. What is more, if the migrant has no location preference (aR = aM and 
bR = bM), her altruistic behavior would reinforce the standard income effect towards a decision not to 
return. 
The second term shows the influence of the relative location preference of the migrant in terms of 
her own consumption. If aR > aM, her relative preference for her home village may partly compensate 
the income effect and logically reduce migration duration. 
The third term reflects the parent’s perception of the well-being of the left-behind child. If the 
child is perceived as suffering from parental absence in her daily life, then bR > bM will give incentive 
to the parent to return. In the vein of Dustmann (2003b), this model illustrates the trade-off that 
migrant parents face when deciding to stay or to return: the consumption of the child is 
multidimensional in that it incorporates daily care and educational prospects that may be somehow 
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conflicting in terms of the decision to return. Assuming no migrant parent location preference in her 
own consumption (aR = aM), the decision to return for an altruistic parent simply reduces to a 
comparison of the loss in utility due to lower income (and then possibly a reduction in education 
opportunities) with the gain in utility thanks to a better-off child (through better daily care for 
instance).  
The two dimensions, daily care versus educational prospects, are quite intuitively related to the 
age of the child: one may expect that daily care will be more valued for young children, while 
educational prospect will be more important if the child is of school-age. Moreover, in a society with a 
strong tradition of sons’ preference17, one may further expect that the return-decision outcome is also 
going to be linked to the gender of the child, although the total children effect may remain ambiguous. 
 
4. Migrant’s length of stay in cities: a duration analysis 
 
4.1 Framework for duration analysis 
 
Migration duration data are right-censored by definition since the date of transition out the state 
(i.e. returning home) is unknown for on-going migrants. As highlighted by Jenkins (2004), survival (or 
duration) analysis offers a number of advantages compared to OLS or binary choice models for such 
kind of data. In particular, it is well suited to account for the timing of the migration events, including 
return migration, for the censoring in the data as well as for incorporating time-varying variables into 
estimation.  
As answers from the respondents were given in months, discrete time periods for migration 
duration are defined in months18. As a consequence, we use a discrete-time (grouped data) version of 
the commonly used proportional hazard (PH) model19, developed by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978). 
When the data set is discrete, the duration time can be divided into k intervals, {[0,), [,)... [,∞)}.The 
discrete-time hazard rate can then be defined as follows: 
                                                        
17 See Lee (2008) for a review of the long history of pro-son bias in China. 
18 When the duration time is discrete, the estimation function is a bit different. A detailed description can be found in Jenkins 
(2004). 
19 The general idea of a proportional hazard model is that the effect of an independent variable is seen as having a constant 
proportional effect on the baseline hazard. The adoption of such model is usually grounded on two important specifications: 
the distributional assumptions regarding the baseline hazard and the assumption of unobserved heterogeneity (Bhat, 1996). 
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],/Pr[ itiiit XtTtTP                (6) 
where Ti is the discrete random variable representing the uncensored time at which the end of 
migration occurs. This measures the conditional probability of individual i’s migration ending at time t, 
given that it has not ended yet. Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) show that the complementary log-log 
model is a discrete-time analogue to the continuous-time Cox proportional hazard model, where the 
hazard function can be given by:  
 ))()('exp(exp1),( ttXXt ii                 (7) 
where λ(t) is the instantaneous probability (hazard rate) of returning at a duration t months, given that 
the individual i stayed in city for at least t months. θ(t), which depends on t alone, is a transformation 
of the baseline hazard common to all individuals. exp(β’Xi(t)) is a person-specific non-negative 
function of covariates X, which scales the baseline hazard function common to all persons. 
Regarding the specification of the baseline hazard function θ, we consider a duration dependence 
pattern analogous to that in the continuous-time Weibull model20 by entering as a covariate the log of t. 
Finally, failure to control for unobserved heterogeneity that arises when unobserved factors influence 
duration can lead to severe bias in the estimates of the covariate effects (Lancaster, 1985). 
Consequently, one could get an under-estimate of the true proportionate response of the hazard if the 
unobserved heterogeneity is not captured due to potential omitted variables or measurement errors 
(Jenkins, 2004). 
Figure 1 displays the Kaplan-Meier survival curve, which clearly highlights negative duration 
dependence: the probability that migration ends shortly increases as the length of migration increases. 
The median survival rate (i.e. stay in cities) is at about 132 to 144 months (11-12 years). When the 
migration spell reaches more than 252 months (that is about 21 years), the overall survival rate finally 
stabilizes at a low level around 12%21, indicating that 12% of the migrants’ population tend to settle 
permanently outside. The smoothed hazard estimate displayed in Figure 2 confirms that the hazard rate 
of return increases with migration duration. For example, at 60 months (5 years), the overall hazard 
rate is only 3% (with a 95% confidence interval from 2% to 3%), whereas at 192 months (16 years), it 
reaches 14% (with a 95% confidence interval from 13% to 15%). 
                                                        
20 The most commonly used form in continuous-time duration studies is a parametric hazard (Bhar, 1996) with an assumed 
Weibull form baseline (Meyer, 1990). 
21 One should note though that for this long duration, the 95% confidence interval gives a range between 5% and 23%. This 
might be related to the fact that we do not have many individuals with such long migration history. 
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4.2 Estimation results 
 
In order to assess how the presence of children by age and by gender affects the length of stay, we 
use a set of children-related variables for each individual at the time of migration. We distinguish 
children at different age levels (children below the age of 16 and children below the age of 6) and by 
gender (for each age-group). Since the number of children may vary throughout the whole period of 
migration, and since these changes may influence the decision on the returning date, we also introduce 
indicator variables that equal one if there is an increase (or no change) in the number of children (by 
age-group and by gender) during migration and zero otherwise. We believe that introducing such 
variables in the model may also help alleviating time-varying problems.  
Control variables for migration duration include individual characteristics such as age22, gender, 
education and marriage, individual migration experience measured by an occupational dummy 
variable that equals one if wage-worker and zero if self-employed during the last job in city (current 
job for on-going migrants), and hometown characteristics measured by the logarithm of the town 
average rural per capita annual net income between 2004 and 2008. We also control for household 
characteristics that may influence the decision to return through the household size.  
Estimation results on the determinants of the hazard rate of returning to source regions with and 
without unobserved heterogeneity are displayed in Table 3 and in Appendix, respectively23. The 
findings are very similar, which indicates that the unobserved heterogeneity is rather small and can be 
ignored. Our interpretations are therefore mainly based on Table 324. While other things are the same, 
Model 1 and Model 2 use a set of control variables related to children under the age of 16 while Model 
3 and Model 4 focus on pre-school children. Under the age of 16, the children population comprises 
both pre-school children and students at school essentially from primary school to senior middle 
school. Model 1 shows that the estimated coefficients for both the number of children under 16 at the 
time of migration and the change in this number during migration are positive and highly significant. 
One more child in the household at the time of migration is significantly associated with a 68% higher 
                                                        
22 The age variable is recomputed in order to reflect the age at the moment of migration. 
23 The estimation results presented in Table 3 and in Appendix exclude five observations whose length of migration is longer 
than 20 years. Our results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of these five observations. 
24 We choose to concentrate on results displayed in Table 3 because we encountered some convergence problem in the 
estimation of Model 4 when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. 
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hazard rate25. The coefficient estimates also indicate that individuals whose number of children during 
migration has increased (or remained unchanged) have a 162% higher hazard rate than others. Model 2 
estimates the separate impact of daughters and sons under 16. Both the number of sons and the number 
of daughters as well as their respective change during migration are positive and significant. 
Nevertheless, two noteworthy differences can be highlighted. First, the sons-related covariates are 
significant at 1%, while the daughters-related covariates are significant only at 5%-10% level. Second, 
the coefficient estimates for sons-related covariates are much larger than those for daughters. In fact, 
having an additional son at the time of migration and an increase in the number of sons during 
migration are associated with respectively 147% and 256% higher hazard rates, while the 
corresponding estimates for daughters are associated with 56% and 125% higher hazard rates. These 
results indicate that although both sons and daughters play an important role in shortening the length 
of migration, sons have an even higher weight in the return decision.  
Model 3 and Model 4 present results with a set of variables related to pre-school children (under 
the age of 6). As shown in Model 3, the number of pre-school children and the change in this number 
during migration are both associated with positive and significant coefficients. Hence, individuals who 
have more pre-school children at the moment of migration return earlier, and migrants for whom the 
number of pre-school children has increased (or remained constant) during migration also have higher 
hazard rates ceteris paribus. These results are fully consistent with the above findings for children 
below 16 years old, and the estimated impacts appear to be substantially higher for pre-school children. 
Regarding the gender of pre-school children, Model 4 shows positive and significant coefficient 
estimates for the number of pre-school sons, but no significant estimates for the number of pre-school 
daughters. In addition, an increase in the number of both sons and daughters during migration is also 
associated with shorter migration duration, although the level of significance and the degree of the 
measured impact differ. These results confirm the importance of pre-school sons in return decision 
among rural migrants. 
To sum up, the main results regarding the impact of left-behind children on migration duration 
can be summarized as follows: i) individual migration duration is driven by family motives, with 
left-behind children being important determinants of return, whatever their age and gender; ii) 
                                                        
25 This is calculated from the exponentiated coefficient, not reported here, which gives the hazard ratios as in a continuous 
time model.  
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pre-school children are a stronger focus for those willing to return, which indicates that daily care may 
be an important driving motivation for individuals; iii) the gender of left-behind children matters on 
the magnitude of the impact on migration spell, with sons pulling parents back even stronger as 
compared to daughters. These results suggest that altruistic parents care about children, whatever their 
age and gender, and they care even more about younger children, with a general gender bias in favor 
of sons. 
In addition to children-related variables, we find consistent and interesting results regarding other 
explanatory variables in all the four models. Unsurprisingly, the baseline hazard increases with elapsed 
survival time, which means that return probabilities depend positively on the length of migration spell 
to date. The increasing baseline can be interpreted as an illustration of the temporary nature of the 
migration phenomenon in China. To further illustrate this point, Figure 3 displays the smoothed mean 
predicted hazard rate based on the estimation of Model 126. It shows that the predicted hazard rate is 
increasing all along migration duration, at a decreasing speed up to the 200th month and an increasing 
afterwards.  
The source region economic conditions are found to have a positive and significant impact on the 
hazard rate: the elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to the town average rural per capita annual net 
income between 2004 and 2008 ranges from 0.82 to 1.28. This finding indicates that favorable 
economic conditions contribute to attracting migrants back home, which is consistent with the 
theoretical prediction that an increase of wage in home country leads to a reduction in the optimal 
international migration duration (Dustmann, 2003a). Therefore migrants from poorer regions may be 
willing to stay longer in the host region than migrants from wealthier emigration regions. The result is 
also consistent with the empirical findings of Schroll (2009) on the case of Denmark.  
Regarding individual characteristics, we find a positive impact of age on the hazard of return. 
People who migrated at an older age are more likely to have higher hazard rates of return. Gender also 
influences the length of migration, with female migrants being significantly more likely to have 
shorter length of stay than male migrants. In terms of household characteristics, a migrant from a 
larger family is more likely to stay longer at destination, which is consistent with the hypothesis that 
increasing returns to scale in household chores for households with a larger size and more labor 
                                                        
26 The mean predicted hazard rate is calculated based on the mean level of the predicted hazard rate for each person given 
the values of his or her covariates and the spell month value (Jenkins, 2004). 
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availability make it easier to let some members engage in migration.  
 
5. Intended return of on-going migrants 
 
To complement the analysis of migration duration, this section tests the impact of left-behind 
children on the intended return of on-going migrants. As described above, our survey provides 
information on out-migrants’ intentions to return or to settle in cities. This enables us to empirically 
examine the determinants of return intentions and to provide a different approach to the evaluation of 
children-related motives to return. As in the migration duration section, we test the impact of children 
by age and by gender. 
The dependent variable is a binary one: it equals one if out-migrants declared their intention to 
return and zero if they declared their intention to stay in cities. The intention to return is postulated to 
reflect the underlying individual’s utility from this choice ( *iy ): 
iii Xy   0*               (8) 
where εi is assumed to be independent from Xi and to have a standard normal distribution. The 
intention to return is given by the following: 



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00
01
*
*
i
i
i yif
yify              (9) 
In the above Probit model, the vector Xi includes a series of variables representing 
children-related factors, individual characteristics, household characteristics, current occupation in 
destination and source region characteristics. Since we exclude answers to the question on return 
intentions that were not strictly ‘yes’ or ‘no’, we are left with 117 individuals currently working 
outside of Wuwei County. 
Table 4 reports the estimates of marginal effects for the probability of intended return. The first 
column shows the results using a baseline specification with the number of children below the age of 
16. The next two columns focus on testing the impact of children by age, and the last four columns 
introduce differences by gender. Model 1 to Model 3 all suggest a positive impact of children of 
different age level on migrants’ intention towards return. More precisely, each additional child under 
the age of 16 in the household increases the return propensity by 16 percentage points. Distinguishing 
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age groups reveals that pre-school children have a strong impact on the intention to return: the 
presence of pre-school children in the household is associated with an increase in the probability to 
return by 38 percentage points, and an additional pre-school child increases the return propensity by 
32 percentage points. Moreover, Model 2 and Model 3 both indicate that the presence and the number 
of school-age children (between 6 and 12) in the household are also associated with a higher 
probability to return, although the impact seems smaller as compared to pre-school children. These 
results are consistent with the predictions of the duration model, demonstrating the positive role of 
children, whatever their age, in pulling migrants back, and the even stronger force of younger children 
(under 6) in attracting on-going migrants back to the rural hometown. 
In the last four columns of Table 4, we introduce a further distinction by gender. The estimates 
show that the gender-bias may be different depending on the age of the child. On the one hand, for 
school-age children, the presence of a son has a significant and positive impact on the intention to 
return, while the presence of a daughter does not seem to have any significant influence. On the other 
hand, the presence of pre-school daughters seems to be more influential than pre-school sons in 
influencing the return decision.  
In light of the prediction of our model, the results by age-group and by gender bring along an 
additional interesting perspective on the trade-off that migrant parents face regarding the education 
prospect of their offspring. On the one hand, since compulsory education is free for children living in 
their official place of registration (i.e. in rural areas for migrant children), an altruistic parent may have 
an incentive to leave her child behind and possibly return if daily parental care is believed to be 
important. On the other hand, for higher education, an altruistic parent may be willing to stay in city to 
be able to support the education fees of her child. As we focus here on school-age children aged 6 to 
12, our findings may capture the first dimension. Moreover, our results by gender indicate that migrant 
parents may value differently the importance of daily care for boys and girls. On the one hand, they 
may worry more of the potentially adverse effect that the lack of parental care produces on education 
outcome of their son(s) rather than their daughter(s) (either because they put more weight on the 
educational achievement of a son, or because they consider that sons require higher monitoring in their 
studies). On the other hand, they may worry more on the impact of parental absenteeism on young 
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(pre-school) daughters27. 
Besides these findings on the effect of children, the estimates of the Probit models also prove to 
be consistent with the predictions of the duration model. First, the household size has a negative 
impact on individual’s return intention, suggesting that migrants from larger family are more likely to 
settle outside rather than return to home villages (where they are less needed). Second, individuals 
from richer regions are more likely to return, suggesting that a favorable economic environment in 
sending regions tends to attract out-migrants back. In terms of individual characteristics, the model 
finds that less educated migrants have a higher probability to express intention to return. This finding 
implicates a potential “brain drain” of less developed rural labor-exporting regions, the most educated 
migrants being the ones willing to settle in cities. Finally, regarding the current occupation in cities, 
wage workers are found to be less likely to return as compared to self-employed.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the role of left-behind children as a motive for return migration in China. A 
simple model based on Dustmann (2003b) is proposed to account for left-behind children through 
altruistic parents’ care about the prospects of their offspring, and to discuss the potential differentiated 
impact depending on children’s age and gender. We then propose two complementary empirical tests 
based on an original dataset from a rural household survey carried out in Wuwei County (Anhui 
province, China) in fall 2008. We first use a discrete-time proportional hazard model to estimate the 
determinants of migration duration for both on-going migrants with incomplete length of duration and 
return migrants with complete length of duration. We then examine the return intentions of on-going 
migrants and specifically estimate the impact of children-related factors by considering both age and 
gender differences.  
A key empirical finding is that both the migration duration study and the return intention study 
show consistent results regarding the role of left-behind children. The duration analysis shows that 
both the number of pre-school children and the number of children under 16 at the time of migration 
as well as an increase in the number of children (for each age-group) during migration have a negative 
                                                        
27 For pre-school children, the key issue is health rather than education. As summarized by Lee (2008), empirical studies on 
gender equality in China found the gender bias to be stronger in health care expenditures and in the intake of nutrients than in 
education. To reduce the potentially negative impact of her absence on her pre-school daughter’s health status, an altruistic 
parent may have a stronger incentive to return. 
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impact on an individual migrant’s length of stay in city. Compared to all children under 16, pre-school 
children have an even stronger impact on migrants’ return decision, and compared to daughters, the 
presence of sons is more influential in shortening a migrant’s length of stay in city. The study of 
on-going migrants’ return intentions confirms the role of left-behind children, whatever their age, as a 
significant motive for return, with a relatively stronger impact of pre-school children on pulling their 
parents back home. As for gender differences, the analysis of return intentions indicates that 
school-age sons and pre-school daughters have a stronger influence than their counterparts of a same 
age-group.  
The proposed analysis contributes to the understanding of migration dynamics within China, by 
exploring the determinants of the spell of rural-to-urban migration and of return decision and taking 
into account the cost of leaving behind children. While important interregional economic disparities in 
China drive the massive rural exodus, our analysis suggests that children-related factors contribute to 
the counter-flow of urban-to-rural return migration. These findings have timely implications regarding 
the “migrant labor shortage” that coastal regions are currently facing. By emphasizing the importance 
of family demand factors in return migration, they highlight the multidimensional nature of migration. 
The simple “success” (NELM) or “failure” (Lewis, 1956; Todaro, 1969) dichotomy and the “double 
selection” theory (Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996) on return migrants may not properly capture all the 
dimensions at stake in migration and return migration. In the case of China where particular 
institutions impose strong constraints on individual or family choice, our findings point to the 
importance of accounting for both economic and non-economic determinants of migration duration to 
analyze the dynamics of migration. In that, they contribute to the literature on migration by stressing 
the importance of using a “family unit” framework in modeling return migration decision mechanisms. 
As Djajic (2008, p. 483) argues, “one of the shortcomings of the existing literature is that, in 
explaining decisions related to return migration, it focuses primarily on the individual migrant, rather 
than on the family unit”. 
Moreover, as internal migration is the main engine of urbanization in China (Wang and Cai, 
2009), understanding the factors that explain variations in migration duration is important for 
designing optimal migration and urban development policies. As discussed above, one of the key 
issues regarding migration duration in China lies in the prevailing “involuntary” separation of 
migrants and their left-behind children, as a social consequence of the restrictions imposed by the 
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hukou system and education policies. Children undoubtedly need physical and mental care from their 
parents. Therefore, a direct implication of our findings is that including migrant children into the local 
urban education system and allowing them to take higher education entrance exams in the places 
where they have attended schools, would certainly contribute to freeing choices for migrants to 
migrate and settle down in cities. This would not necessarily entail a full reform of the hukou system 
but rather the access to public services not being tied anymore to the household registration place. 
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Table 1 - Migration spells statistics 
 
 Average migration 0-1 year 1-3 years 3-5 years 5-8 years ≥8 years 
 spell Percentage 
On-going migrants  6.87 
(5.57) 
13% 19% 19% 18% 30% 
Return migrants  6.74 
(5.51) 
15% 25% 15% 12% 33% 
All 6.81 
(5.54) 
14% 22% 18% 15% 32% 
Observations 284 39 62 50 43 90 
 
Source: Wuwei 2008 Survey 
Notes: Standard deviation in parenthesis. 
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Table 2 - Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean value or % Full sample Return migrants Out-migrants with 
intention to return 
Age (years) 34.23 40.02 34.29 
Female (=1) 0.415 0.411 0.353 
Married (=1) 0.722 0.887 0.824 
Education (years) 6.750 5.903 6.382 
Household size 4.673 4.250 5.147 
Having at least one child less than 16 (=1) 0.539 0.565 0.676 
Having at least a son less than 16 (=1) 0.363 0.347 0.529 
Having at least a daughter less than 16 (=1) 0.292 0.298 0.353 
Having at least one child less than 6 (=1) 0.282 0.234 0.412 
Having at least a son less than 6 (=1) 0.130 0.105 0.118 
Having at least a daughter less than 6 (=1) 0.151 0.129 0.294 
# children less than 16 0.754 0.710 1.088 
# sons less than 16 0.405 0.371 0.559 
# daughters less than 16 0.349 0.339 0.529 
# children less than 6 0.324 0.266 0.441 
# sons less than 6 0.158 0.129 0.118 
# daughters less than 6 0.165 0.137 0.324 
Having return migrants and/or migrants in the 
household (=1) 
0.630 0.556 0.647 
# other out-migrants in the household 0.975 0.782 1.294 
# return migrants and migrants in the household 1.447 1.315 1.706 
# return migrants and migrants in the village 28.30 27.94 26.41 
Age at first migration (years) 24.11 26.31 23.88 
Length of stay (years) 6.815 6.742 9.711 
Occupation before return (wage worker=1) 0.782 0.685 0.765 
Average rural per capita annual net income 
(2004-2008) (Yuan) 
3628.7 3775.9 3727.2 
Observations 284 124 34 
Source: Wuwei 2008 Survey 
Notes: Some averages are calculated over a smaller number of observations because of missing values. We only 
report the total number of observations for reference.  
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Table 3 - Discrete time proportional hazard estimates 
(without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Baseline hazard (log spell month identifier) 0.389***
(0.000) 
0.429***
(0.000) 
0.371*** 
(0.000) 
0.433***
(0.000) 
Age at migration 0.0452***
(0.000) 
0.0472***
(0.000) 
0.0327*** 
(0.003) 
0.0395***
(0.001) 
Married (=1) 0.239 
(0.412) 
0.208 
(0.482) 
0.458 
(0.113) 
0.316 
(0.281) 
Female (=1) 0.655***
(0.001) 
0.578***
(0.005) 
0.664*** 
(0.001) 
0.605***
(0.002) 
Years of education 0.0378 
(0.271) 
0.0516 
(0.147) 
0.0320 
(0.329) 
0.0390 
(0.244) 
Occupation before return (wage worker=1) 0.261 
(0.215) 
0.346 
(0.115) 
-0.168 
(0.482) 
-0.113 
(0.619) 
Log average rural per capita annual net income (2004-2008) 
1.070** 
(0.024) 
0.889* 
(0.062) 
1.284*** 
(0.007) 
0.820* 
(0.096) 
Household size -0.328***
(0.000) 
-0.324***
(0.000) 
-0.371*** 
(0.000) 
-0.297***
(0.000) 
# children (<16) at migration 
0.521***
(0.002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increased number of children (<16) during migration (=1) 
0.964***
(0.001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
# sons (<16)  
 
 
0.902***
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 
Increased number of sons (<16) during migration (=1) 
 
 
1.270***
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 
# daughters (<16) 
 
 
0.447* 
(0.062) 
 
 
 
 
Increased number of daughters (<16) during migration (=1) 
 
 
0.813** 
(0.022) 
 
 
 
 
# of children (<6) at migration  
 
 
 
0.992*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Increased number of children (<6) during migration (=1)  
 
 
 
1.494*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
# sons (<6)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.835***
(0.000) 
Increased number of sons (<6) during migration (=1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.842***
(0.000) 
# daughters (<6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.435 
(0.294) 
Increased number of daughters (<6) during migration (=1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.118** 
(0.040) 
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Constant 
-17.03***
(0.000) 
-16.99***
(0.000) 
-18.50*** 
(0.000) 
-16.81***
(0.000) 
Number of person-month observations 21869 21869 21869 21869 
Log likelihood -734.7 -730.7 -735.1 -728.9 
Source: Wuwei 2008 Survey 
Notes: p-values in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The coefficients are estimated using the 
complementary log-log model, where the coefficient on the duration dependence variable is the log of time. 
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Table 4 - Probit estimates of out-migrants' return intention (Marginal effect) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Age at migration -0.00804 
(0.387) 
-0.0117 
(0.177) 
-0.0106
(0.231) 
-0.0104
(0.253) 
-0.0105 
(0.224) 
-0.00997 
(0.272) 
-0.00929
(0.309) 
Age -0.0347 
(0.300) 
-0.0333
(0.325) 
-0.0410
(0.255) 
-0.0398
(0.275) 
-0.0356 
(0.314) 
-0.0378 
(0.304) 
-0.0416
(0.252) 
Age square 0.000549 
(0.209) 
0.000604
(0.170) 
0.000696
(0.145) 
0.000682
(0.152) 
0.000620 
(0.167) 
0.000644 
(0.172) 
0.000688
(0.146) 
Married (=1) 0.181 
(0.231) 
0.0854 
(0.583) 
0.0582 
(0.726) 
0.0714 
(0.663) 
0.0873 
(0.586) 
0.0761 
(0.645) 
0.0671 
(0.690) 
Female (=1) -0.0567 
(0.533) 
-0.0313
(0.732) 
-0.0582
(0.520) 
-0.0490
(0.587) 
-0.0422 
(0.652) 
-0.0581 
(0.527) 
-0.0631
(0.486) 
Years of education -0.0289* 
(0.091) 
-0.0354**
(0.028) 
-0.0380**
(0.025) 
-0.0324*
(0.068) 
-0.0355** 
(0.035) 
-0.0344* 
(0.059) 
-0.0380**
(0.034) 
Household size -0.0979*** 
(0.006) 
-0.111***
(0.005) 
-0.137***
(0.000) 
-0.132***
(0.002) 
-0.108*** 
(0.008) 
-0.126*** 
(0.004) 
-0.132***
(0.001) 
Current job (wage worker=1) -0.362* 
(0.056) 
-0.402**
(0.036) 
-0.421**
(0.024) 
-0.417**
(0.039) 
-0.415** 
(0.032) 
-0.416** 
(0.039) 
-0.424**
(0.027) 
Log average rural per capita 
annual net income 
0.698** 
(0.042) 
0.839** 
(0.018) 
0.726** 
(0.029) 
0.765** 
(0.021) 
0.763** 
(0.023) 
0.725** 
(0.027) 
0.682** 
(0.039) 
# children (<16) 0.161* 
(0.072) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At least one child under 6  
 
0.380** 
(0.014) 
 
 
0.429** 
(0.012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At least one child between 6 
and 12 
 
 
0.208 
(0.114) 
 
 
 
 
0.231* 
(0.080) 
 
 
 
 
# children under 6  
 
 
 
0.320** 
(0.016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
# children between 6 and 12  
 
 
 
0.247** 
(0.037) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At least one son between 6 
and 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.280* 
(0.100) 
 
 
0.254 
(0.130) 
0.286* 
(0.085) 
At least one daughter 
between 6 and 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.181 
(0.358) 
 
 
0.194 
(0.330) 
0.266 
(0.196) 
At least one son under 6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.253 
(0.228) 
0.347 
(0.149) 
 
 
At least one daughter under 6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.479*** 
(0.008) 
0.492*** 
(0.008) 
 
 
# sons under 6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.249 
(0.141) 
# daughters under 6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.341** 
(0.019) 
Pseudo R2 0.197 0.226 0.237 0.242 0.238 0.247 0.241 
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Source: Wuwei 2008 Survey.  
Notes: Sample size (for all models): 117 observations. p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. Marginal effects measure the change in the probability of intended return from a unit change in the 
explanatory variable. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering by households (82 households). 
 
 
 
 
Figure-1 
 
 
 
Figure-2 
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Figure 3 
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Appendix - Discrete time proportional hazard estimates 
(controlling for unobserved heterogeneity) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Baseline hazard (log spell month identifier) 0.389*** 
(0.000) 
0.429*** 
(0.000) 
0.371*** 
(0.000) 
Age at migration 0.0452*** 
(0.000) 
0.0472*** 
(0.000) 
0.0327*** 
(0.002) 
Married (=1) 0.239 
(0.412) 
0.208 
(0.480) 
0.459* 
(0.093) 
Female (=1) 0.655*** 
(0.002) 
0.578*** 
(0.004) 
0.664*** 
(0.001) 
Years of education 0.0378 
(0.299) 
0.0516 
(0.145) 
0.0321 
(0.319) 
Occupation before return (wage worker=1) 0.261 
(0.216) 
0.346 
(0.115) 
-0.168 
(0.470) 
Log average rural per capita annual net income (2004-2008) 1.068 
(0.118) 
0.889*** 
(0.010) 
1.286*** 
(0.000) 
Household size -0.328*** 
(0.000) 
-0.324*** 
(0.000) 
-0.371*** 
(0.000) 
# children (<16) at migration 0.521*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
 
 
Increased number of children (<16) during migration (=1) 0.964*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
 
# sons (<16)   
 
0.902*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Increased number of sons (<16) during migration (=1)  
 
1.271*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
# daughters (<16)  
 
0.447* 
(0.062) 
 
 
Increased number of daughters (<16) during migration (=1)  
 
0.813** 
(0.021) 
 
 
# children (<6) at migration  
 
 
 
0.992*** 
(0.000) 
Increased number of children (<6) during migration (=1)  
 
 
 
1.494*** 
(0.000) 
Constant -17.01*** 
(0.004) 
-16.99*** 
(0.000) 
-18.52*** 
(0.000) 
Number of person-month observations 21869 21869 21869 
Log likelihood -734.7 -730.7 -735.1 
Source: Wuwei 2008 Survey 
Notes: p-values in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Due to a convergence problem in the estimation for the constant, we do not report here the results of the model 
that corresponds to Model 4 in Table 3. 
